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This study presents the results of an experiment on spatial differentiation of products in 
Hotelling-type models with different grades of complexity for companies’ choices of space. 
Three models were compared, including models with a single decision variable (single-
dimensional space with automatically calculated prices), two decision variables (single-
dimensional space with prices assigned by the participants) and three decision variables (bi-
dimensional space with prices assigned by the participants). The research revealed that in 
more complex conditions, the product differentiation was smaller and that the prices were 
lower than in a simple environment when the Nash equilibrium was confirmed. Companies 
that function in complex conditions do not take advantage of the opportunity to make high 
profits based on product differentiation. This has a greater impact on price rigidity with 
respect to product variety than could be theoretically predicted. Strategies based on product 














Commonly known spatial models based on the work of Hotelling (1929) or Salop (1979) 
explore the effects of horizontal product differentiation on companies working within specific 
structures.  The  applicability  of  these  models  is  limited  based  on  several  unrealistic 
assumptions, including e.g. (for example) the one-dimensional choice space of a company 
(two decision variables – the single-dimensional goods‟ location and price), the linear (or 
quadratic)  transportation  costs,  non-uniform  consumer  distributions,  perfectly  inelastic 
demand, a homogeneous product provided by two companies, and the assumption of full-
market saturation (market demand is fully served by the market players). 
As  a  response  to  the  discrepancies  between  existing  theories  and  market  realities,  many 
studies have sought to explore the role of factors such as the form of the transportation costs 
function (e.g. d‟Aspermont, Gabszewicz and Thisse - 1979, Economides – 1986), the demand 
distribution function (e.g. Shilony - 1981, Caplin and Nalebuff - 1991, Tabuchi and Thisse - 
1995, Anderson, Goeree and Ramer - 1997, Scrimitore - 2003), its elasticity (e.g. Smithies - 
1941, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse - 1992, Rath and Zhao - 2001) and endogeneity (e.g. 
Fujita and Thisse - 1986, Bloch and Manceau - 1999, Garcia-Gallego, Georgantzis and Orts-
Rios  -  2001),  the  size  of  companies  in  the  market  (e.g.  Böckem  -  1994,  Hinloopen  and 
Marrewijk - 1999, or Kopczewski, Kusztelak and Pogorzelski -2009) and the number of firms 
(e.g.  Salop  -  1979,  Economides  -1993a,  Brenner  -  2001)).  However,  many  models  have 
emerged,  which  explore  the  influence  of  the  choices  that  companies  make  regarding  the 
spatial placement of their products choice companies‟ space form on the equilibria they obtain 
and describe the following placements of products: on a circle (Salop - 1979), on an unlimited 
quantity of straight parallel lines or a perpendicularly crossed – Manhattan metric (Braid - 
1999), on a rectangle (Vendrop and Majeed – 1995, in the case of symmetrical placement, and 
Tabuchi - 1994 for any not necessarily symmetrical placement), in a tri-dimensional space 
(Ansari, Economides and Steckel - 1998) and in a multi-dimensional space (Irmen and Thisse 
- 1998).                                                                                                             
In the Nash equilibrium, predictions theoretically indicate two or more dimensions of models 
in which companies differentiate their products using one profile (the more significant profile 
is used), providing a homogenous product in all remaining dimensions. Companies are not 
able to increase their profits by differentiating their product in more than one profile. Market 
practice  seems  to  prove  that  on  the  one  hand,  companies  contribute  products  in  many 
dimensions to the market, but on the other hand, these products‟ profiles differ insignificantly. 
Moreover, this type of multidimensional, apparent differentiation allows for a decrease in the 
price competition between companies, leading customers to believe that each specific product 
type  represents  a  unique  form  with  no  close  substitutes.  In  this  study,  we  verified  the 
hypothesis that increasing the number of choice space dimensions provides a company with a 
decrease in product differentiation while limiting price competition at the same time, which 
contradicts the predictions of theoretical models.                                                                                                 
To verify the theoretical predictions and the hypothesis, the experiment with three different 
grades of complexity for companies‟ choices of space was performed. The published literature 2 
 
suffers from lack of experiments analysing the effects of spatial differentiation of products 
and its influence on price competition. This research can be divided into experiments that 
analyse the influence of the elasticity of demand and the demand distribution function (e.g. 
Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw and Schenk - 1993, or Kruse and Schenk - 2000), the number of 
companies in the market (e.g. Collins and Sherstyuk - 2000, Huck, Müller and Vriend - 2002, 
Orzen  and  Sefton  –  2008,  Morgan,  Orzen,  and  Sefton  –  2006,  or  Garca-Gallego  and 
Georgantzis – 2001), the sizes of companies (e.g. Barreda - 2000, Kopczewski, Kusztelak and 
Pogorzelski  -  2009)  and  the  demand  endogeneity  (Camacho-Cuena,  Garcia-Gallego, 
Georgantzis  and  Sabater-Grande  -  2005).  Our  findings  demonstrate  that  theoretical 
predictions are not often confirmed in research, and a key value of spacial experiments is that 
they show possible causes for discrepancies. Discrepancies between theory and reality may 
result from communication problems (Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw and Schenk – 1993, or Kruse 
and  Schenk  –  2000),  incomplete  rationality  of  firms  that  use  near-epsilon  equilibrium 
strategies (Collins and Sherstyuk – 2000), entities‟ risk aversion (Collins and Sherstyuk – 
2000), or model complexity (Kruse and Schenk 2000).
1 
This  study  presents  the  results  of  an  experiment  that  evaluated  the  effects  of  spatial 
differentiation of products using Hotelling-type models with different grades of companies‟ 
choices of space complexity. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no other studies 
that systematically analysed the influence of spatial complexity on a company‟s location and 
the  degree  of  price  competition.  Mangani  and  Patelli  (2002)  performed  the  spatial 
experiments  with  a  greater  than  single-dimensional  choice  space  for  a  company.  They 
analysed  a  model  with  two  companies  that  made  price  and  location  decisions  in  various 
sequences. The experiment consisted of three stages. In the first stage (FT), decisions were 
made in two substages: (1) the participators chose a location in two-dimensional space at the 
same  time  and  independently;  (2)  having  knowledge  of  their  own  and  their  opponent‟s 
location, the participants fixed the prices. In the second stage of the experiment (ST), the 
decisions  were  also  made  in  two  substages.  The  only  difference  was  the  location  choice 
frequency, which was one choice for every four price decisions. In the third stage (TT), the 
decisions concerning prices and locations were made in the same substage. In this case, there 
are no Nash equilibria, which has been proved by Economides (1987). The results obtained by 
Mangani and Patelli show that theoretical predictions could not be confirmed. Participants 
chose  locations  near  the  centre  with  slight  product  differentiation,  which,  according  to 
Mangani and Patelli, was caused by the participants‟ risk aversion. Participants provided the 
most demanded product types to minimise their market exclusion. The results did not reflect 
the existence of reliance between the product differentiation and the price. The price level was 
generally higher than predicted by the model, and even with zero product differentiation, it 
                                                 
1 Kruse and Schenk (2000) performed a series of single-stage spacial experiments (with choice of location for 
products sold for fixed prices only)  with two companies and flexible demand expressed by a line function. 
Model 2x2 results have been compared in which the participants chose between two options only (central vs. 
edge-based), with the, so called, complete model 100x100, in which each of the participants chose one of one 
hundred points signifying possible locations in the experiment with or without a communication option. The 
results showed that the tested persons recognized the optimal Pareto point, but they were not able to achieve it. It 
was much easier in the simplified version of the experiment (2x2 model), and it was even easier when the 
communication option was included. 
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did  not  reach  the  marginal  cost  level.  A  definite  disadvantage  of  the  research  was  the 
improper structure of the experiment. Successive research stages conducted together resulted 
in an inability to distinguish two overlapping effects that influenced participants‟ decisions: 
(i) increasing experience and (ii) changes in the tested environment. The experiment did not 
test the relationship between the space complexity and participants‟ decisions, which was the 
main goal of this study. 
2. The model 
We  assume  the  K-dimensional  company  choice  space,  where  each  dimension  length  is 
identical and approaches  . The customers‟ preferences are distributed uniformly in the space. 
There  are  two  companies  in  the  market:  1  and  2,  which  offer  products  located  at  points 
defined  as                           and                         ,  respectively,  where  a 
particular companies point location is defined as the distance between           and the 
point, whereas             ,             , for          . Without loss of generality, assume 
that               for           ,  i.e.,  we  set  the  characteristics  of  the  product  offered  by 
company 1 closer, or even identical, to the starting point of the product characteristics for the 
second company. The unit cost of buying a product different from the consumer‟s ideal choice 
comes to    and is proportional to the square of the distance between the perfect product and 
the one offered by a given company. The distance is defined as a second norm (Euclidean 
distance). Furthermore, it was assumed that a single product is produced at zero cost by each 
firm,  each  consumer  buys  only  one  unit,  all  consumers  feel  the  same  satisfaction  from 
purchasing their perfect product (       for each  ), and the consumers show no preferences 
for particular companies.  
The usefulness of the consumer located at point                  coming from purchasing 
company   product placed in point                         can be defined as: 
   
                  
            
   
   
  (2.1) 
where        per each   - reservation price is equal for all consumers;    is the company   
product  price,  where           -  two  companies  in  the  market;  K  is  the  number  of  space 
dimensions;   is the analysed consumer‟s perfect product;    is location of the product offered 
by a company  ;    is unit transportation (mismatch) cost; and     
            
   
   
 is the 
total product transportation cost. 
Indifferent consumers gaining equal utility from purchasing both product types results in the 
following equation: 
          
            
   
   
           
            
   
   
  (2.2) 
Deriving    from the equation above, we obtain: 4 
 
                     
          
      
      
  
 
   
   
               
    
              
   
   
  
                (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) describes indifferent consumer‟s location with an assumption that there are K-
1 fixed characteristics and that only the K-th characteristic is variable. We then obtain a single 
point  set.  Generally,  the  space  defining  all  indifferent  customers  is  a  point  for  a  single-
dimensional space, a straight line for a two-dimensional space, a plain for a three-dimensional 
space and a K-1 space for a K-dimensional space. 
Knowing the indifferent consumer‟s location, we can determine the demand for particular 
goods: 
             
     
    
  
                      












The outcome of this model is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for two stages: (1) 
in the first stage, companies simultaneously and independently of one another define their 
product‟s location; (2) in the second stage, while knowing the location of all the products sold 
in the market, companies assign their prices simultaneously and independently.  
D‟Aspremont C. J., Gabszewicz J., and Thisse J. F. (1979) demonstrated that in a single-
dimensional  model  (section  located)  with  square  transportation  costs,  companies  obtain 
profits when they provide spatially differentiated products in the market. The equilibrium 
principle of maximum product differentiation is satisfied, i.e., company 1 will provide product 
        , company 2:         , and market prices will be equal:                    . Companies 
share the market 50/50 and gain profits:                      . 
Tabuchi (1994) performed an equilibria analysis in two-dimensional space, and Irmen and 
Thisse (1998) performed this analysis in multi-dimensional space. In the equilibrium model, 
in a space with more than one dimension, companies will only maximally differentiate their 
products  in  one  dimension,  providing  homogenous  goods  in  all  other  aspects.  Irmen  and 
Thisse (1998) proved that if all of the characteristics have similar significance, the model of 
K-dimensional  space  has  K  location  equilibria  in  the  form  of:         
 
        
 
    and 
        
 
        
 
  ,  in  which  companies  differentiate  their  products  in  dimension     
      and provide homogeneous products in the remaining K-1 dimensions. However, if 
those  characteristics  are  identical,                       ,  all  SPNE  market  prices  are 
equal:                     , and companies equally share the market  and profits:              
       , which are equal as in single- and two-dimensional space models. 
3. Experiment design 
The experiment was performed in sessions, which differed based on company choice space 
(single  or  bi-dimensional)  and  the  price  decision  mechanisms  (price  level  was  assigned 
automatically or by the participants). The remaining parameters of the model were the same in 
all of the sessions. We assumed that the unit product transportation cost in each dimension 5 
 
comes to         and is proportional to the square of distance between the perfect product 
and a product offered by a given company, the length of each dimension is equal to      , the 
customers‟ preferences are distributed uniformly in the space, consumers present perfectly 
inelastic unit demand (reservation price       ), and there are only two companies in the 
market, each one producing only one type of product with   production costs. Decisions were 
made  in  two  stages.  In  the  first  stage  the  participants,  simultaneously  and  independently 
defined  their  products‟  characteristics.  Participants  could  exchange  messages  concerning 
product location in the market. The message content was strictly defined, and there was no 
possibility for any other communication. This communication limit was used to eliminate 
coordination problems. In the second stage, having learned all of the products‟ characteristics, 
the participants simultaneously and independently one from another assigned prices to the 
products.  
Three experimental sessions were conducted, each one with different model complexity. In 
session 1, the only decision variable was the location in a single dimension. In session 2, the 
participants defined the levels of two variables – location and price. In session 3, there were 
three decision variables – two location dimensions and product price. In the first experimental 
session,  the  company  choice  space  was  single-dimensional  and  consisted  of  101  location 
fields (between 0 and 100). The experiment participants made location choices, and prices 
were  assigned  automatically  by  the  computer  program  according  to  the  best  response 
procedure used in the Nash equilibrium price subgame.
2 In the second experimental session, 
the company choice space remained single-dimensional and consisted of 101 location fields 
(between 0 and 100). In this session, the participants made both location and (later) price level 
decisions. In the third session ,  the  choice space was  two-dimensional and consisted of 
101*101 location fields (between 0 and 100 in each dimension). The participants made both 
location and price level decisions, just as in session 2.  
The participants‟ registration of their choices was performed online with ORSEE software. 
Over 90% of the participants were students of Warsaw University, 33% (total) were students 
of  the  Department  Faculty  of  Economy  Sciences,  17%  were  students  of  the  Faculty  of 
Journalism  and  Political  Science,  13%  were  students  of  the  Faculty  of  Law  and 
Administration, and 9% were students of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology. Women 
constituted  56%  of  the participants,  and  the  remaining  44%  were  men.  Participants  were 
between 19 and 26 years old, and the average age was 22. The total number of research 
participants was 90 persons, including 36 in the first session (divided into 4 groups), 28 in the 
second session (in 3 groups), and 26 in the third session (in 3 groups). The entire study lasted 
approximately  50  minutes.  The  decisions  were  made  anonymously.  All  of  the  sessions 
proceeded according to the following schedule: the participants had 15 minutes to familiarise 
themselves with printed instructions, and simultaneously, to improve their comprehension of 
                                                 
2  The  precise  instructions  were  the  following:  Decisions  about  the  price  level  for  both  you  and  another 
participant’s product is made by the “Assistant” program. This program assigns the best prices to  products 
based on profit maximization, i.e., your product price, compared to the price of the other product. The other 
participant’s product price maximizes his profits compared to your product price. In summary, the “Assistant” 
chooses the price that is the best response (in both products locations given) to the price expected from the 
second player. The “Assistant” determines the potential prices of this equilibrium model (Nash equilibrium). 6 
 
the profit calculation mechanism, they could train their decisions on a simulator on which 
they were informed about profits and shares in the market after having been given the location 
and price of the products of each company. The experiment was performed using specially 
designed software based on the LabSEE platform.
3 
All of the sessions consisted of 30 stages with three trial stages at the beginning. The number 
of stages was not revealed to the participants to eliminate the final stage effect. During each 
stage, a random selection of participants took place, and the participants were joined in pairs. 
The pairs were switched to prevent reputation development and to ensure that the participants‟ 
decisions were independent from the other player‟s previous decisions. The first experimental 
session was extended with an additional 10 stages based on the second session rules, and 
these additional stages were performed immediately after the 30 regular stages in the first 
environment. At the end of the experiment, the participants were given short surveys with 
brief  questions  about  their  age,  sex,  course  of  study,  faculty  and  number  of  economics 
semesters passed. 
Payment of participants was proportional to their results in the experiment. An “Experimental 
dollar” unit had a value equal to 10 Polish Groszy (1ED=0.1PLN). Average remuneration was 
24 PLN (minimal remuneration was 16 PLN, and the maximal was 38). The payments were 
made directly after the experiment termination. 
4. Research hypotheses and theoretical predictions 
According  to  predictions  resulting  from  the  theoretical  models,  the  companies  should 
differentiate their products in one dimension only, providing a homogeneous product in the 
second characteristic if it exists. In the first and second session, according to the SPNE, one of 
the companies should locate its product at the   point, while the second should locate its 
product at the     point; the product prices should come to                 ; market shares 
should be     for each participant; and profits should be                 . In the third session, 
the products should be located in the middle of the opposite sides, and prices, market shares 
and company profits will be the same as in the previous sessions. According to theoretical 
predictions,  the  companies  are  unable  to  increase  their  profits  by  differentiating  the 
product they offer in more than one characteristic. In market practice however, companies 
provide multidimensionally differentiated products, but the differences between the accessible 
products  in  each  characteristic  are  insignificant.  Furthermore,  such  multidimensional, 
illusionary differentiation can help to decrease price competition between companies, creating 
an impression among customers that the products are unique and have no substitutes.  
The main hypothesis of this study was consistent with market observations: Increasing the 
dimension number of company choice space results in reduction of product differentiation 
and  price  competition  limiting.  Companies  strive  to  create  many  dimensions  of 
differentiation to increase their profits.  
                                                 
3 LabSEE – is a platform for performing economic experiments that is used by the Experimental Economy 
Laboratory  FES WU. For decision  mapping purposes, the special  graphic design has been prepared  – see 
appendix 1. 7 
 
The verification of this hypothesis is described in section 5 based on four sub-hypotheses: 
H1: In the complex structure model, the participants do not use the equilibrium strategies. 
Companies provide products differentiated similarly in all of the dimensions into the market 
instead of single-dimensional differentiation, as occurs according to theory. 
H2:  Increasing  model  complexity  results  in  lower  product  differentiation  and  irrevocable 
social loss (product transportation cost increase). 
H3: Increasing model complexity results in market price growth and decline of consumer 
surplus. 
H4: Increasing model complexity results in company profit growth.  
Verification of the presented hypothesis is significant; economists engaged in the subject of 
spatial product differentiation concentrate on differentiation determinants, pointing out that 
assumptions  made  in  the  basic  model  flatten  the  structure  of  competing  companies 
excessively. The models that are emerging are, however, very mathematically complex, and it 
seems impossible to find any equilibria in a general model that could describe reality in a 
proper way. From the predictions of theoretical models, the multidimensional choice space 
reveals that companies will maximally differentiate their products in one characteristic only, 
producing homogeneous products in all remaining dimensions. Empirical verification of the 
hypothesis would mean that the theoretical predictions cannot be confirmed in the real world, 
mainly because of the assumptions guiding the decision mechanisms used by the participants 
and not because of assumptions about the individuals functioning in the market. 
5. The experiment results  
A  preliminary  illustration  of  the  data  is  given  in  Fig.  1  (Part  1).  The  products‟  location 
frequency in a particular space in the experimental sessions is presented. In session 1, the 
edge  locations  prevailed  (54.63%  edge  locations,  with  only  5.93%  locations  in  centre), 
whereas in the remaining sessions, the majority of the products were located near to centre (in 
session 2, 1.90% of locations were at the edge, with 43.93% of locations in the centre, and in 
session 3, 0.26% of locations were to the side of the centre, with 39.1% of locations in the 
centre). Furthermore, in session 3, except for the centralised locations, the diagonal product 
locations prevailed (33.46%), with the same products on the straight lines joining the centres 
of the opposite sides (22.82%).
4 These observations indicate, that in sessions 2 and 3 , the 




                                                 
4 All of the results define the percentage of observations that were no more than 2% of maximum distance from 
the point indicated. The 3rd part of the drawing 5.1 shows the areas around the diagonal and straight lines joining 
the centers of the opposite sides.  8 
 
Fig. 1 Products location, differentiation and price in experimental sessions. 


























According  to  hypothesis  H2,  increasing  model  complexity  results  in  lower  product 
differentiation. To verify this result, indexes have been calculated that measure the distance 
between the location of the products and the Nash equilibrium locations: 
        
    
         (5.1) 
where:                              
   
     
   
   is the distance between company   product and the 
central point in the Nash equilibrium model and                        
   
     
   
 is the actual 
distance from that point, whereas K  is the location‟s dimension number (K=1 in session 1 
and  2,  K=2  in  session  3).  Index          is  explained  as  the  percentage  of  product 
differentiation in relation to equilibrium differentiation. It takes values between 0 and 1 (in 
sessions 1 and 2) or    (in session 3).  
Average  product  differentiation  was  definitely  higher  in  session  1  than  in  the  remaining 
sessions,  which  is  confirmed  by  the          -  average  (session  1:  73%,  session  2:  19%, 
session 3:  22%), and median (respectively:  84%, 15%, 18%). The product  differentiation 
layout  spread  was  the  largest  in  the  first  session,  which  is  shown  by  the  absolute 































































































































































































































































































































26%, respectively). Because of significant difference in average values between experiment 1 
and  the  remaining  experiments,  relative  differentiation  measures  indicate  the  opposite 
relationship (proportion of distances between the quartiles and the median comes to 56%, 
173%, and 144%, respectively). The statistical  density        in each session is shown by 
Fig. 1 (Part 2).    
Both  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  and  U  Mann-Whitney  test  demonstrated  the  significant 
differences  between  the          statistical  distribution  in  session  1  and  in  the  remaining 
session.
5  Hypothesis H2, stating that growing model complexity results in a decrease in 
product  differentiation,  has  been  partially  confirmed .  Surprisingly,  increases  in  double 
decision  variables  resulted  in  inversio n  of  the  complete  product  differentiation  layout. 
However, adding the  next decision variable caused  relatively small changes. 
Market prices 
According to the theoretical predictions, there is a positive relationship between the product 
differentiation level and the market price level. Therefore, in session 1, the highest prices are 
to be expected.  However, the price competition level in sessions 2 and 3 could be lower than 
the  theoretical  predictions,  which  is  indicated  in  hypothesis  H3.  Such  a  situation  might 
explain the lesser product differentiation in these cases. The experimental results, however, 
show that in session 1, in which the prices were determined automatically by the computer 
program, they were almost two times higher than in sessions 2 and 3 (the average price in the 
following sessions came to 14.55, 7.02, and 7.53), which is shown in Fig. 1 (Part 3). In 
session 1, the prices were usually placed at a level between 18-20 (approximately 40% of 
observations),  whereas  in  experiments  2  and  3,  prices  between  2  and  10  prevailed 
(approximately 80% of observations). The tests performed prove the statistical significance of 
the  differences  of  the  price  level  between  the  experimental  session  1  and  the  remaining 
prices.
6 Therefore, hypothesis H3, stating that growing model complexity results in market 
price increases, has been rejected.  
The  obtained  result  is  rather  surprising.  It  shows  that  during  the  sessions,  when  the 
participants defined their products prices themselves, the price competition was stronger than 
could be deducted from the Nash equilibrium. The  results of economic experiments usually 
indicate the opposite situation – the participants cooperate with each other, pacifying the price 
competition and gaining higher profits than in the competition equilibrium. In this case, the 
competition was greater than in competition equilibrium, in which the result was a lower 
profit level.                                                                                                                                                 
Company profits 
In the analysed model,  the companies‟ profits were determined by the price and location 
decisions. As the price level was the highest in session 1 and the lowest in session 2, similar 
relationships were found in the companies‟ profits – the average prices in sessions 1, 2 and 3 
                                                 
5 The test statistics comparing sessions: 1 to 2 and 1 to 3 were D=0.719 and D=0.677, respectively, in the K-S 
test, and to Z=31.452 and Z=29.559, respectively, in the M-W test. 
6 Test statistics comparing the sessions: 1  to 2 and 1 to 3 were D=0.624 and D=0.603, respectively, in the K-S 
test and to Z=25.232 and Z=23.45, respectively, in the M-W test. 10 
 
were  7.31,  2.82,  and  3.21,  respectively.  The  tests  performed  confirm  the  statistical 
significance of profit level differences between experimental session 1 and the other sessions.
7 
Hypothesis H4, stating that increasing model complexity results in profit gains by companies, 
has been rejected. Admittedly, the profits in session 3 were higher than in session 2 ; yet, the 
difference was relatively small, and the highest profits  were gained by  the participants of 
session 1, in which the model complexity was the smallest. 
To summarise the analysis, the hypothesis states that increasing the number of dimensions in 
the companies choice space causes lower product differentiation with simultaneous limiting of 
price competition. It is possible that the increase of the model complexity will be gradual as  
new decision  variables   are  introduced.  However, it  appeared  that  intr oducing  a  second 
decision variable only (level of prices) caused a complete change in the participants‟ decision 
process,  which  was  reflected  by  completely  inverted  market  prices  and  the  spatial 
differentiation of products in the comparable models. Adding the decision space dimensions 
of another company resulted in relatively insignificant changes. 
6.  Assessment  of  the  discrepancy  between  the  empirical  results  and  the  theoretical 
predictions 
In this section, we attempt to provide an explanation for the discrepancies between the results 
of the experiment and the hypothesis and the theoretical predictions that were made. The aim 
of  this  analysis  is  also  to  explain  the  decision  processes  used  by  the  participants  in  the 
experimental sessions. 
Decisions coordination problems 
The basic reason for the failure of the theoretical predictions in reality could be problems with 
the coordination of decisions made by the participants.
8 To provide a diversified product, the 
participants had to choose its type – closer to the left or to the right edge of the area. Lack of 
decision coordination results in peripheral types of simultaneous choices that have no large 
differences  between  each  other.  This  trend  was  the  motivation  for  introducing  limited 
communication into the test. However, even in this case, the participants can use a strategy 
based on maximisation of demand, which is reflected in the choice to locate one product next 
to another based on the central type. We can then propose the following hypothesis:  
H5: Coordination problems affected the location decisions. 
When analysing product differentiation, we must note that the participants cannot define the 
product  differentiation level  directly, as  they have no influence on the other participants‟ 
decision. The participants only decided their product location, which can be described as the 
distance from the centre in proportion with the distance in Nash equilibrium, which means: 
                                                 
7 Test statistics comparing the sessions: 1 to 2 and 1 to 3 were D=0.612 and D=0.573, respectively, in the K-S 
test and Z=26.799 and Z=24.494, respectively, in the M-W test.  
8 Coordination problems in product differentiation models were subjects of research of Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw 
and Schenk (1993). 11 
 
        
    
         (6.1) 
where:                           
   
     
   
  is the distance of     company  product  in  the Nash 
equilibrium from the central point,                      
   
     
   
  is the actual distance from 
this point, and K  is the location‟s dimension quantity (K=1 in session 1 and 2, K=2 in session 
3).        is explained as a per cent of the product distance from the centre area regarding 
the location in the Nash equilibrium. It takes values between 0 and 1 (in session 1 and 2) or 
   (in session 3). A value below 1 means that the product‟s distance from the centre is lower 
than it would be based on theoretical predictions. 
In practice, the         statistics layout may differ from the        statistics layout (the 
distribution of product distances in relation to the central type may differ from the product 
differentiation layout). To compare them, a coordination measure formula has been created: 
      
      
      
  (6.2) 
The      statistic measures the distance between companies as a proportion of distance 
from the centre – expressed as a percentage of the equilibrium. It takes values between 0 and 
1       ,  where  0  indicates  the  complete  lack  of  coordination,  and  1  indicates  complete 
coordination. For         , all locations are symmetric towards the centre of the area, and 
for         , the products are located toward one side of the market. 
The  coordination  of  location  decisions  in  all  of  the  sessions  was  high  and  had  no  inner 
significant differences (the average values were 94% in the first session and 88% in the other 
sessions).  This  result  means  that  the  coordination  problems  did  not  cause  failure  of  the 
theoretical predictions concerning the spatial product differentiation. Moreover, they cannot 
be the basis for explaining the differences in the decisions made by the participants in the 
successive experimental sessions. The basic statistic describing the distance between products 
and  the  centre  (      )  are  close  to  the  product  differentiation  statistic  (      )  –  the 
average values in the successive sessions were 77%, 23% and 26%, respectively, and the 
median values were 98%, 10%, and 15%, respectively. Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and U 
Mann-Whitney test demonstrated the significant differences between the        statistical 
distribution in session 1 and in the remaining session.
9 We confirmed that the coordination 
problems were not  responsible for the results, which means that hypothesis H5 has been 
rejected. 
Lack of experience 
Another problem that often occurs during the experimental research is the participants‟ lack of 
experience. We can give the following hypothesis: 
H6: The participants are characterised by lack of experience. 
                                                 
9 Test statistics comparing sessions 1 with 2 and 1 with 3 were D=0.613 and D=0.619, respectively, in the K-S 
test and Z=28.817 and Z=26.667, respectively, in the M-W test. 12 
 
The verification of this hypothesis can be performed in two ways. On the one hand, we can 
determine if the decisions made in successive stages had higher stability and came closer to 
the theoretical equilibrium, according to the following hypothesis: 
H6_1: There is convergence of stabilisation points in the successive stages. 
On the other hand, we can determine whether the participants who were economics students 
and had finished courses in this field (the students who should have wider knowledge of the 
theoretical equilibrium) behave in a different way than the individuals with no such skills. The 
following hypothesis is proposed to describe this situation: 
H6_2:  The economics  students,  who  have  finished basic  courses  in  microeconomics,  use 
strategies closer to equilibrium, which helps them to gain higher profits than the students of 
other sciences, who lack knowledge in economics. 
The first experimental session was performed in 40 stages. In stages 1-30 the participants 
decided only on the location of the product in single-dimensional space, whereas in stages 31-
40, they decided on the price level as well. Fig. 2 presents the distances from the area centre 
(       statistics), the prices and the profits for successive stages in individual experimental 
sessions. The average values have been connected by thick lines, and the variability range is 
indicated with dashed lines (average plus/minus standard deviation).  
Fig. 2 Average variable values and variability ranges in successive stages. 
 
Part 1. Session 1 
       
 




Part 2. Session 2 






Part 3. Session 3 







In session 1 (Fig. 2 part 1), the        statistic growth is seen from approximately 60% in the 















































































































































variable  had  a  large  standard  deviation,  which  was  considerably  decreased  in  successive 
stages  (the  variability  coefficient  dropped  from  approximately  70%  in  the  first  stages  to 
approximately  20%  in  stage  30).  This  result  indicates  that  there  was  initially  a  large 
discrepancy  between  the  strategies  used  by  the  individual  players.  However,  it  dropped 
successively during the test. In stage 31, the experimental environment had been changed, 
which did not have any radical impact on the location of the products in relation to the central 
area. Nevertheless, the growth tendency was stopped. After a gradual decrease in the value of 
the        statistic to the level of approximately 80% in stages 31-33, the results stabilised 
until the final stage. This change also caused the used strategic differentiation, which is seen 
in the increase in the variability coefficient from 20% in stage 30 to approximately 40% in the 
last stages. Similar tendencies were also seen in the products prices and profits. Both variables 
demonstrated an increasing tendency (average prices: 8.7 – in stage 1, 17.5 – in stage 30 and 
average profits: 4.4 – in stage 1, 8.7 – in stage 30) and were highly, but decreasingly variable 
(from approximately 80% – in stage 1 to approximately 25% – in round 30). In round 31, the 
increasing tendencies of the statistics were stabilised at approximately 16.5 for prices and 
approximately 8 for  profits, with variability coefficients of approximately 40%. 
The second experimental session differed significantly from session 1, which can be seen in 
Fig. 2 (Part 2). The product location, in relation to the central location, changed slightly in the 
next stages and came to approximately 25% of the Nash equilibrium distance. This variable 
demonstrated a high standard deviation. The variability range came to approximately 120% 
and did not change significantly during the experiment, which could be caused by the large 
differentiation  of  the  location  strategies  used  by  the  participants.  Both  prices  and  profits 
demonstrated decreasing tendencies. The prices dropped from approximately 11 in stage 1 to 
approximately 5.5 in stages 17-30, and profits decreased from approximately 4.5 in stage 1 to 
2.2  in  stages  17-30.  The  differentiation  of  both  variables  decreased  during  the  test.  The 
standard deviation of prices decreased from approximately 5 to 3 in the final stages, and the 
standard deviation of profits decreased from 4 to approximately 1.7. This result demonstrates 
that there was a learning process in the first experimental stages. However, the decrease in 
absolute variability partially resulted from the decrease of the average variable values, as can 
be seen in the variability coefficient, which oscillated throughout the entire experiment around 
the value of approximately 60% for prices and approximately 80% for profits. 
The 3rd experimental session was similar to session 2, which is shown in Fig. 2 (Part 3). The 
       statistic oscillated between 20% and 30% and was highly variable throughout the 
testing  period  (the  variability  coefficient  was  approximately  120%).  Prices  and  profits 
demonstrated a decreasing tendency. In the first stages, the values were approximately 14 for 
prices  and  approximately  5  for  profits,  whereas  in  the  second  part  of  experiment,  they 
stabilised  at  approximately  5.5  for  prices  and  2.3  for  profits.  The  variability  coefficient 
throughout most of the stages was approximately 45% for prices and approximately 70% for 
profits. 
The  analysis  shows  that  in  all  sessions,  the  participants  were  learning.  The  points  of 
stabilisation for prices and profits can be seen, and the variable levels approached these points 
in  successive  stages.  The  points  differ,  however,  between  session  1  and  the  remaining 14 
 
sessions. A different trend was observed in the        statistic. In the first session, this value 
grew in the successive stages, reaching over 90%, whereas in the second and third session, it 
oscillated between 20% and 30%. Still, the difference in the        statistic values from the 
first stages of session 1 and the remaining stages is worth mentioning. This difference results 
from the fact that before the main experiment had started, the participants had time to learn 
the instructions and could train their decisions on the simulator. This process clearly helped 
the session 1 participants to better understand the relationships between the type of products 
and the profits, which resulted in choosing more peripheral locations from the first paid stage.  
The evaluate hypothesis H6_1, the test period was divided into three parts consisting of equal 
numbers of stages. The decision variables in the first and last 10 stages were confirmed. Two 
non-parametric tests for indirect tests were performed – the Wilcoxon Test and the Sign Test, 
which showed that in the 1st experimental session, location and price decisions changed, 
whereas in the remaining sessions, only the changes in the price decisions were statistically 
significant.
10  Therefore,  hypothesis  H6_1,  stating  that  there  is  a  convergence  to  the 
stabilisation points in the successive stages, has been then confirmed.  
Positive  verification  of   the  H6_1  hypothesis  means  that   when  comparing  individual 
experimental sessions, it is not necessary to review  all of the stages. Instead, stages after 
stabilisation should be selected, which includes only last 10 stages. However, it is necessary 
to repeat the comparative analysis of the results obtained in individual experimental sessions 
in the last 10 stages to evaluate the main research hypotheses, including: H2-H4. 
Verification of hypotheses H2-H4 for results obtained in the last 10 stages 
Fig.  3  demonstrates          statistics,  prices  and  profits  in  subsequent  stages  in  all 
experimental sessions. Experiment Series1_1 shows the results of session 1 stages 21-30, with 
automatic price fixing, and Series1_2 shows the results of session 1 stages 31-40, with prices 
fixed by the participants. 
Fig. 3 Average product differentiation and company prices and profits in the last 10 stages in 
individual experimental sessions. 
  






                                                 
10 The test statistics comparing the        statistic differences in subsequent sessions were Z=3.61, Z=0.841 
and Z=1.003, respectively, in the Wilcoxon Test and Z=2.739, Z=1.155 and Z=0.981, respectively, in the Sign 
Test. The tests statistics that compare the differences in prices in successive sessions were Z=5.122, Z=4.554 and 
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In Fig. 3, an almost identical         variable course is seen in the successive stages of 
sessions 2 and 3 (Series2 and Series3, respectively). The product differentiation was larger in 
session  1,  both  in  the  case  of  automatic  price  regulation  and  when  price  was  a  decision 
variable. We note that the        variable value is smaller in the second case; however, it is 
nearly  four  times  larger  than  in  session  2  (approximately  80%  for  the  series1_2,  with 
approximately 20% for series2). This result is surprising, as the experiment environment in 
both cases was identical. The only difference was the experience gained by the participants in 
the previous stages. The session 1 participants had continuous access to the previous sessions‟ 
results records (played with the “Assistant”), which indicated the most profitable strategies 
based  on  higher  product  differentiation.  The  results  from  Series2  revealed  slight  product 
differentiation.  Moreover,  in  session  1,  after  introduction  of  the  second  decision  variable 
(price), variability increased (the difference between the third and first quartile grew from 
26% to 44%), and the average value decreased (the average dropped from 84% to 78%, and 
the median dropped from 96% to 90%). The experiments performed have shown that the 
product  differentiation  layouts  did  not  differ  statistically  in  Series2  and  Series3,  and  the 
remaining differences were statistically significant.
11 Therefore, the H2 hypothesis stating that 
increasing model complexity results in  a decrease in  product differentiation  was  partially 
confirmed. The  increase in the number of  decision variables  from one to two caused   an 
increase  in  model  complexity  when  successive  s pace  dimensions  were  added  with  no 
statistically significant changes.  
The average prices value in subsequent stages of all experimental sessions is shown in Fig. 3. 
As for product differentiation, in Series2 and Series3, the prices were defined at a very similar 
level and were approximately 5,6. In session 1, the price level was approximately three times 
higher. The price release (Series2) caused a brief growth to a level exceeding the value caused 
by the Nash equilibrium for maximum product differentiation (the prices were over 20). The 
competition between the companies caused the market prices to decrease in successive stages, 
which eventually stabilised  at  a level slightly lower than in the first part of  session 1 
(Series1_1)  –  approximately  16.5.  Moreover,  the  market  prices  from  session  1,  in  the 
Series1_1 and Series1_2, have similar average values (16.75 and 16.97, respectively). This 
variable distribution remained scattered – 25% of the prices in part 2 were over 20, whereas in 
part 1, there was no such observation. These conclusions are confirmed by the test results
12, 
which showed a lack of differences between the prices in Series2 and Series3. The U Mann-
Whitney test showed a lack of differences between Series1_1 and Series1_2. This test verifies 
the null hypothesis, showing a lack of significant difference between the arithmetic averages. 
The most suitable explanation seems to be, however, the results of the Kolmogarov-Smirnov 
test, which evaluates the zero hypothesis and states that the accumulated frequency layouts of 
                                                 
11  Test  statistics  in  the  K-S  test  were  D=0.133 (comparing  Series1_1  and  1_2),  D=0.808  (Series1_1  of  2), 
D=0.816 (Series 1_1 of 3), D=0.77 (Series 1_2 of 2), D=0.791 (Series1_2 of 3) and D=-0.064 (Series2 of 3). The 
statistics in the M-W test were Z=2.876 (comparing Series1_1 and 1_2), Z=20.463 (Series1_1 and 2), Z=20.112 
(Series1_1 with 3), Z=19.444 (Series1_2 with 2), Z=19.125 (Series1_2 with 3) and Z=-0.025 (Series2 with 3).  
12 The statistics in the K-S test were D=0.172 (comparing the Series1_1 with 1_2), D=0.816 (Series1_1 with 2), 
D=0.838 (Series1_1 with 3), D=0.789 (Series1_2 with 2), D=0.812 (Series1_2 with 3) and D=-0.077 (Series2 of 
3). The statistics from the M-W test were Z=1.164 (with comparison between  Series1_1 and 1_2), Z=19.477 
(Series1_1 and 2), Z=19.402 (Series1_1 and 3), Z=19.363 (Series1_2 and 2), Z=19.363 (Series1_2 and 3) and 
Z=0.017 (Series2 and 3). 16 
 
comparable variables do not differ significantly from each other. It not only compares the 
average but also the  entire layout. This test revealed that differences between the market 
prices in Series1_1 and Series1_2 are statistically relevant. Therefore, hypothesis H3, stating 
that  increasing  model  complexity  results  in  market  price  increases,  has  been  rejected. 
Similarly, hypothesis H4, which stated that increasing model complexity causes profit growth, 
has also been rejected. The layout of profits obtained by the participants is not relevantly 
diversified in Series2 and Series3, in which they were definitely lower than in both parts of 
session 1. The profits in Series1_2, i.e., after the prices release, were statistically lower than 
before the release (Series1_1).
13  
The results obtained in this study can be compared to a real situation. In the experiment, the 
sessions can be divided into two types. The first type consisted of sessions 2 and 3, in which 
the participants had to make their price and location decisions by themselves. Not knowing 
the theoretical premises, they chose low-risk strategies, diversifying their products to a small 
extent. This process helped the participants gain positive profits, although the profits were  
lower than the potentially attainable profits if the full market potential was used. In the second 
type of  session,  there was  the first experimental session,  in which  the participants  were 
familiarised with the simulator for first 30 stages , making the decisions simpler and their 
consequences  more predictable. In  Series1_2,  the participants  had the option  to use the 
experience they had gained. This allowed them to gain higher profits than in the Series2 and 
Series3. The  use of  the  “Assistant”  to  define  price  levels  played  the  role  of  a  market 
simulator, which helped to predict the results of the decisions made regarding the introduction 
of a given product type into the market and then resulted in higher profits. 
It is interesting to determine if the decisions made by the participants were influenced by their 
lack of experience and knowledge of the mechanism by which the profits were calculated in 
the experiment. To  explain  this  observation, hypothesis  H6_2, stating that  the  economics 
students  who  have  completed  microeconomics  courses  will  use  strategies  closer  to  the 
equilibrium model than students of other sciences, which will result in higher profits, has been 
verified. At the end of the experiment, the participants were given a short survey, which they 
were asked to complete, e.g. the number of economic courses having passed. It was beneficial 
to  divide  the  participants  into  two  groups.  The  first  one  (Group1)  was  comprised  of 
economics students who had completed at least two semesters of economic studies. Those 
students had attended e.g. microeconomics courses in which the Nash equilibrium was taught 
and the basic Hotelling product spatial differentiation model was explained. The second group 
(Group2)  was  comprised  of  non-economics  students,  having  passed  no  more  than  one 
semester of economics. 
The test results (appendix 2) show that in Series1_1 and Series1_2, there were no significant 
differences in product differentiation, prices and profits between the groups. In Series2, the 
                                                 
13  The  statistics  in  the  K-S  test  were  D=0.228  (with  comparison  between  Series1_1  and  1_2),  D=0.814 
(Series1_1 and 2), D=0.809 (Series1_1 and 3), D=0.695 (Series1_2 and 2), D=0.69 (Series1_2 and 3) and D=-
0.076 (Series2 and 3). The test statistics in the M-W test were Z=4.179 (comparing to Series1_1 and 1_2), 
Z=19.818 (Series1_1 and 2), Z=19.333 (Series1_1 and 3), Z=16.797 (Series1_2 and 2), Z=16.26 (Series1_2 and 
3) and Z=-0.907 (Series2 and 3). 17 
 
participants with greater knowledge in economics set their prices at a statistically lower level 
than the participants without an economics education, and in Series3, the participants from 
Group1 provided less diversified products to the market, choosing locations nearer to the 
centre of the area, than the Group2 participants. However, there were no relevant statistical 
differences in the obtained profits. This result means that the theoretical knowledge had a 
rather  small  influence  on  the  participants'  location-price  strategies.  This  aspect  does  not 
explain any discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical results. Therefore, 
hypothesis H6_2 has been then rejected. 
Motivational determinants of risk 
 Hypothesis  H6_1,  which  defined  the  product  convergence  through  stabilisation  points  at 
subsequent stages, was verified, and it was confirmed that there is a large difference between 
the location strategies used by participants in Series2 and 3. It is possible that the choice of 
product  types  away  from  the  centre  brought  higher  profits,  which  also  bore  higher  risk 
(variability). In this case, the decisions made could be based on risk aversion. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H7:  Risk  aversion  determines  the  location  strategies.  The  participants  with  lower  risk 
aversion (or risk loving) produce more differentiated product types than the ones with higher 
risk aversion. 
To  evaluate  this  hypothesis,  the  participants  from  all  of  the  experimental  sessions  were 
divided into the three groups with respect to average product distance from the centre of the 
area  (statistics        ).  Approximately  1/3  of  the  participants  (33%  in  Series1_1  and 
Series1_2, 32% in Series2 and 31% in Series3) with the highest average composed the group: 
       , the same number of participants  with  the lowest  average composed the group: 
       , and the remaining participants found themselves in the group:     . Then, the 
prices, demands and profits from both extremes were compared. The results demonstrate the 
large  discrepancy  between  the  product  location  strategies  used  by  the  participants  in  the 
individual groups. In the group        , the average distances from the central type were  
100% in Series1_1, 99% in Series1_2, 43% in Series2 and 47% in Series3, whereas in the 
group        , the averages were  62% in Series1_1, 52% in Series1_2, 5% in Series2 and 
7% in Series3. The prices, demands and profits in successive experimental sessions are shown 
in table 1. 
Tab.1  Prices,  demands  and  profits  divided  into  the  groups           and           in 
successive sessions. 
                                                                                                                                            
MAXDIST MINDIST MAXDIST MINDIST MAXDIST MINDIST
Average 19.51 14.00 49.65 51.83 9.72 7.22
StDev 2.31 4.95 1.73 4.44 1.25 2.52
Average 19.05 14.84 45.01 57.31 8.18 7.52
StDev 5.37 6.69 19.98 27.17 3.77 3.81
Average 6.99 4.68 47.17 51.89 2.67 2.10
StDev 4.09 2.49 34.04 36.51 2.12 1.63
Average 7.64 4.19 39.20 57.21 2.70 2.28







In table  1, we  can see  that in  all  of the experimental sessions, the profits  gained by the 
participants who located their products far from the centre (group        ) were higher in 
general  than  the  profits  of  participants  who  chose  the  location  closer  to  centre  (group 
       ).  Moreover,  in  Series1_1  and  Series1_2,  the  strategies  based  on  higher  product 
differentiation were less risky, which is demonstrated by the lower standard deviation of the 
profits. In those experiments, the atypical products were more profitable regardless of the risk 
aversion  of  participants.  In  Series2  and  Series3,  the  wider  product  differentiation  was 
connected  with  higher  risk  (larger  standard  deviation),  which  confirms  the  hypothesis. 
However, in the sessions with more complex space, the differences in profits between the 
groups are statistically irrelevant (appendix 3). Therefore, hypothesis H7 has been rejected. 
Low price elasticity of demand equalises the opposite effects of demand and price 
According to theory, in the spatial models, companies are under the influence of two opposite 
forces: centripetal force evoked by the demand effect and centrifugal force resulting from the 
price effect. On the one hand, companies increase their markets shares by launching popular 
goods and services. On the other hand, these products have close substitutes, which keeps 
their prices at the lower level. The theoretical equilibria in the analysed models show that the 
price effect prevails over demand, which results in maximum product differentiation in a 
single dimension. As the experimental results only showed small product differentiation in the 
sessions with high spatial complexity, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H8: The empirical results, unlike the theoretical predictions, show that demand and price 
effects are equal. 
Comparing the average prices and demands between the groups of participants who located 
their products closer (       ) or farther (       ) from the centre (table 1), we can see 
both the effects of price and demand. These effects are also confirmed by the correlation 
analysis between the variables, the results of which are found in table 2.  
The  R  Spearman  coefficient  of  correlation  demonstrates  that  in  all  of  the  experimental 
sessions, a positive relationship between the product-centre distance (       statistics) and 
price was observed. Higher prices allowed the participants to gain higher profits. However, 
the shorter the distance between the product and the centre, the higher demand it evoked. 
Higher  demand  also  translates  to  higher  profits.  All  relationships  mentioned  above  (bold 
letters in table 2) were statistically significant. In Series1_1 and Series1_2, the price effect 
prevailed, which was demonstrated by the positive correlation between the        statistic 
and the profits. This result explains the wide differentiation of products in this session. In 
sessions 2 and 3, the correlation between those variables was close to zero and statistically 
irrelevant. The important conclusion is the following: the participants could not increase their 
profits  by  locating  their  products  farther  from  the  centre.  Therefore,  hypothesis  H8  was 




Tab. 2 R Spearman coefficient of correlation between prices, demands, profits, distance 
from the centre and product differentiation in successive experimental sessions. 
 
Interestingly, price and demand effects were mutually neutralised in sessions 2 and 3. It is 
possible  that  the  participants  did  not  use  the  option  of  price  competition  smoothing  by 
increasing product differentiation. A question remains regarding the empirical relationship 
between product differentiation and price and its conformity with the theoretical relationship. 
To explain these questions, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
H9:  The  reason  for  the  failure  of  theoretical  predictions  regarding  product  spatial 
differentiation is the discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical relationships between 
product differentiation and price. In this research, price elasticity was lower than what was 
theoretically predicted. 
The  hypothesis  presented  above  was  verified  based  on  results  obtained  in  Series1_2  and 
Series2, which were performed in an identical experimental environment; the differences in 
strategies used by the participants resulted only from the experience gained in previous stages. 
The relationship between product differentiation (       statistics) and price was examined. 
The empirical results on the theoretical results background are shown by Fig. 4. In section 1, 
the  point  graphs  demonstrating  the  empirical  relationships  are  presented,  and  they 
demonstrate an increasing tendency with a large spread. In Series1_2 (Fig. 4, Part 1), the line 
dependence between the analysed variables explains approximately 30% of the variability 
(adjusted            ), and the function form is shown by the equation:                 
               .
14  A positive absolute term means that the participants , who  provided 
                                                 
14 The variable (test statistics:          ) and constant (        ) parameters of the        are significantly 
different from zero, and the function form is correct (Durbin-Watson statistics:          ). 
Series1_1
Damand R=0.074 (p=0.162)
Profit R=0.997 (p=0) R=0.143 (p=0.007)
DIST_1 R=0.996 (p=0) R=0 (p=0.999) R=0.987 (p=0)
DIST_2 R=0.709 (p=0) R=-0.522 (p=0) R=0.664 (p=0) R=0.757 (p=0)
Series1_2
Damand R=-0.441 (p=0)
Profit R=0.315 (p=0) R=0.582 (p=0)
DIST_1 R=0.635 (p=0) R=0 (p=1) R=0.528 (p=0)
DIST_2 R=0.52 (p=0) R=-0.249 (p=0) R=0.181 (p=0.001) R=0.727 (p=0)
Series2
Damand R=-0.43 (p=0)
Profit R=0.134 (p=0.025) R=0.745 (p=0)
DIST_1 R=0.465 (p=0) R=0 (p=1) R=0.363 (p=0)
DIST_2 R=0.322 (p=0) R=-0.196 (p=0.001) R=-0.012 (p=0.842) R=0.539 (p=0)
Series3
Damand R=-0.355 (p=0)
Profit R=0.144 (p=0.021) R=0.816 (p=0)
DIST_1 R=0.648 (p=0) R=0 (p=1) R=0.382 (p=0)
DIST_2 R=0.521 (p=0) R=-0.205 (p=0.001) R=0.029 (p=0.644) R=0.653 (p=0)
Price Demand Profit DIST_1
Price Demand Profit DIST_1
Price Demand Profit DIST_1
Price Demand Profit DIST_120 
 
completely homogeneous products to the market, do not compete as strongly as it is predicted 
by theory, therefore avoiding the Bertrand paradox. The increase in product differentiation 
resulted in the smoothing of the price competition, despite the slower rate of price growth, 
than what was theoretically predicted.
15 The market prices were more rigid than predicted 
based on the model. In Series2 (Fig. 4, Part 2), the line model explains 21% of the variability 
(adjusted             ),  and  the  function  form  is  expressed  by  the  equation:         
                         .
16 The companies were then able to avoid the Bertrand paradox 
by selling the homogeneous products for positive prices, even though the price competition 
was stronger in that case than it was in Series1_2. Moreover, in this session, the market prices 
reacted  to  the  even  weaker  differentiation  increase,  which  demonstrated  their  smaller 
elasticity, than in the  Series1_2.  This result  means that the participants did  not use their 
market opportunities to smooth the price competition and gain higher profits  as the result of 
strategies based on product differentiation.  
Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium prices for the individual locations in Section 2. Slight differences 
in the equilibrium prices for the values of the         statistic result from the asymmetrical 
product location. The observations located below the dashed straight line indicate that the 
analysed product was located farther from the centre, and the observation above the straight 
line shows the opposite situation. For this reason, the adjusted    statistics is slightly smaller 
than 1 (it is above 0.96 in both sessions).  
The third section Fig.4 shows the comparison between the empirical and theoretical results. It 
shows that in Series1_2, the participants fixed their average prices at higher levels than the 
theoretical  prices  at  each  of  the  differentiation  levels,  even  though  this  difference  was 
decreasing with the increase of the        statistic. In Series2, one can clearly see that for the 
small differentiation, the empirical  prices exceeded the theoretical  ones,  and the opposite 
relationship was seen for this large differentiation. This observation explains the process of 
grouping the products around the central types during the session. The companies did not get 
any benefit from providing the peripheral types to the market because they could not use 
monopolistic power, which appeared as a result of the introduction of peripheral types. This 
situation  did  not  occur  in  Series1_2,  in  which  the  market  prices  were  higher  than  the 
theoretical prices for any product differentiation – from minimal to maximal. Regarding the 
relatively low price elasticity that was also observed in this case, some of the participants 
located their products inside of the tested area, providing only partially differentiated product 
types to the market. 
 
 
                                                 
15  The theoretical relationship is expressed with the equation:                        . 
16 In this case, the model parameters are significantly different from zero. The test statistic values are            
for the variable parameter of        and           for the constant parameter; the function form is also correct, 
which is confirmed by the Durbin-Watson statistics (         ). 21 
 
Fig.  4  The  empirical  and  theoretical  relationship  between  the  product  differentiation 
(      ) and the price level in Series1_2 and Series2. 



















In summary,  the reason  for the failure of the theoretical predictions regarding the spatial 
distribution  of  products  was  the  discrepancy  between  the  empirical  and  theoretical 
relationship between the product locations and their price levels, which means that hypothesis 
H9 has been confirmed. 
7. Conclusions                                                                                                                              
The aim of this study was to analyse the influence of model complexity on the participants‟ 
location-price  decisions.  We  found  that  the  structural  complexity  of  the  model  has  a 
significant  influence  on  the  participants‟  behaviour  in  the  market.  However,  changes  in  
behaviour were not gradual, as was expected; instead, the changes were more discontinuous. 
Addition  of  a  second  decision  variable  causes  complete  product  differentiation  inversion, 
which influenced prices and profits. In one-dimensional space, the participants behaved as 
was predicted by the theory – they provided maximally differentiated products to the market, 
gaining relatively high profits. In two- or multi-dimensional models, the situation was the 
opposite. The participants provided the products that appeared different. In this case, the price 
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prices than had been defined in the theory for a given product differentiation); however, the 
market price levels were unquestionably (almost three times) lower than in the session with a 
simple model structure. This result was the participants‟ reaction to their uncertainty. They 
used the safest strategies based on providing well-known, popular, highly demanded product 
types. Because the products offered in the market differed slightly, the companies were forced 
to  run  a  strong  price  competition  policy,  which  had  a  negative  impact  on  their  profits. 
Increasing the companies choice space by adding the next decision variable did not have any 
statistically significant influence on the market.    
Regarding  the  failure  of  the  theoretical  predictions,  we  have  attempted  to  explain  the 
discrepancies  with  experimental  findings.  It  has  been  proven  that  lack  of  experience  and 
coordination problems could not account for this phenomenon. The main reason for the low 
level of product differentiation may be the low price elasticity in relation to product diversity. 
The empirical relationships were definitely weaker than the theoretical relationships, which 
resulted in neutralising the effects of demand and price on the two opposite spatial models. 
The companies were then unable to gain greater-than-average profits using strategies based on 
product differentiation. The location strategies used by the participants were, to some extent, 
determined by risk aversion as well. 
In  the  real  world,  product  decision  space  complexity  is  very  high,  and  the  results  of 
companies‟  decisions  are  associated  with  a  high  uncertainty  level.  In  such  cases,  the 
experimental results indicate insignificant (illusionary) product differentiation in many mutual 
dimensions, which seems to confirm the research hypothesis. The companies were not able to 
stop increasing price competition between the products, resulting in much lower profits than 
possible. The results of the research show that the problem of failure of theoretical predictions 
regarding  spatial  product  models  results  mainly  from  assumptions  about  the  participants 
decision-making mechanisms and not from assumptions about the environment. In complex 
circumstances, companies do not take advantage of opportunities for high profits that could be 
gained by diversified products, which results in a higher rigidity of prices with respect to 
product  differentiation.  The  strategies  based  on  product  differentiations  are  then  less 
profitable in practice than it is assumed in theory. 
The conclusions of this research are extremely important for explaining the effects of the 
commonly observed phenomenon of increasing the quantity of product dimensions. In the 
modern world, we observe  the introduction of  new features  for  products  and services by 
companies to achieve differentiation. It may seem that this process is motivated by a desire 
adapt  the  product  to  customers‟  needs.  However,  analysis  of  the  products  on  the  market 
reveals that they are extremely similar to each other. The results of this research explain this 
phenomenon. The participants‟ reaction to the growing environmental complexity was that 
they were forced to make decisions of increasing risk due to an inability to predict the results 
of the decisions. Therefore, the safest strategy is to produce the verified and most highly 
demanded types of products. The  increase in  the dimensions  of  product  differentiation is 
therefore  unfavourable  both  for  the  producers  (dropping  profits)  and  for  the  consumers 
(smaller real product differentiation with increased complexity, complicating the choice of the 
most preferable products).  23 
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Appendix 







Appendix  2.  Tests  of  the  significance  of  differences  in        ,        ,  prices  and 
profits  between  the  groups  with  larger  (Group1)  and  lower  (Group2)  theoretical 
knowledge in particular experimental series. 
 
 
Appendix  3.  Tests  of  the  significance  of  differences  in  prices,  demands  and  profits 
between  two  extreme  groups  (         and         )  in  relation  to  average  product 




Series1_1 D=0.078 (p>0.10) D=0.113 (p>0.10) D=0.088 (p>0.10) D=0.079 (p>0.10)
Series1_2 D=0.063 (p>0.10) D=0.045 (p>0.10) D=0.098 (p>0.10) D=0.172 (p<0.05)
Series2 D=-0.149 (p>0.10) D=-0.053 (p>0.10) D=-0.201 (p<0.05) D=-0.156 (p>0.10)
Series3 D=-0.246 (p<0.025) D=-0.256 (p<0.01) D=-0.099 (p>0.10) D=-0.156 (p>0.10)
U Mann-Whitney test 
Series1_1 Z=0.415 (p=0.678) Z=1.088 (p=0.277) Z=0.315 (p=0.753) Z=0.27 (p=0.787)
Series1_2 Z=0.187 (p=0.851) Z=0.591 (p=0.554) Z=0.613 (p=0.54) Z=1.824 (p=0.068)
Series2 Z=-0.215 (p=0.83) Z=-1.764 (p=0.078) Z=-2.393 (p=0.017) Z=-0.673 (p=0.501)
Series3 Z=-3.362 (p=0.001) Z=-3.316 (p=0.001) Z=-0.844 (p=0.399) Z=-1.635 (p=0.102)
DIST_1 DIST_2 Price Profit
DIST_1 DIST_2 Price Profit
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Series1_1 D=0.792 (p<0.001) D=-0.65 (p<0.001) D=0.792 (p<0.001)
Series1_2 D=0.425 (p<0.001) D=-0.3 (p<0.001) D=0.208 (p<0.025)
Series2 D=0.333 (p<0.001) D=-0.144 (p>0.10) D=0.167 (p>0.10)
Series3 D=0.6 (p<0.001) D=-0.363 (p<0.001) D=0.175 (p>0.10)
U Mann-Whitney test 
Series1_1 Z=11.82 (p<0.001) Z=-5.999 (p<0.001) Z=11.666 (p<0.001)
Series1_2 Z=6.118 (p<0.001) Z=-3.616 (p<0.001) Z=1.867 (p=0.062)
Series2 Z=4.306 (p<0.001) Z=-0.858 (p=0.391) Z=1.571 (p=0.116)
Series3 Z=7.641 (p<0.001) Z=-3.077 (p=0.002) Z=0.454 (p=0.65)
Price Demand Profit
Price Demand Profit